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TESTING THE LIMITS OF CHOICE OF LAW
CLAUSES: FRANCHISE CONTRACTS AS
A CASE STUDY
GEORGE F. CARPINELLO*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most conflicts scholars and courts now recognize the principle that the
parties to a contract generally may agree upon the law which will govern
their relationship.' "One of the few non-controversial maxims of conflicts is
that the autonomy of the parties should be given great weight."' While the
principle of party autonomy has only recently achieved preeminent and al-
most uncontested status in American conflicts of law,3 it has long held such
* Professor of Law and Director of the Government Law Center, Albany Law School, A.B.
1972, Princeton University, J.D. 1975, Yale Law School.
1. See e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7.36, at 369 (3rd
ed. 1986). Professor Weintraub believes that deference to the law intended by the parties "seems
to have sprinted ahead of the field" of choice of law rules in the contract area. Professor Wein-
traub, however, urges rejection of the party autonomy rule in favor of one based on validation. In
other words, the presumption should be "that the contract and all its provisions are valid, not
merely that the choice-of-law clause is valid." Id. at 371; see also Trautman, Some Notes on the
Theory of Choice of Law Clauses, 35 MERCER L. REv. 535, 537-38 (1984). But see, Friedler, Party
Autonomy Revisited: A Strategy Solution to a Choice-of-Law Problem, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 471,
479 (1990) (arguing that courts pay lip service to party autonomy, but that, in practice, such
clauses tend not to be honored); Note, Effectiveness of Choice of Law Clauses and Contract Con-
flicts of Law Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982) (argu-
ing that courts do not honor party autonomy where to do so would strip one party of the
protection of its own state).
2. Kozyris, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1987 An Overview, 36 AM. J. COMP. L.
547, 560 (1988).
3. Professor Beale, reporter of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, expressly
rejected the principle of party autonomy as giving "permission to the parties to do a legislative act.
It practically makes a legislative body of any two persons who choose to get together and contract
.... So extraordinary a power in the hands of any two individuals is absolutely anomalous ......
2 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW § 332.1, at 1079-80 (1935). The rule
adopted in the Restatement (First) was, therefore, lex loci contractus: The law of the place of the
making of the contract determined its validity and interpretation, except as to matters of perform-
ance. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 332, 358 (1934). The authors of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW have rejected Beale's criticism as "obsolete,"
noting that the law chosen by the parties is honored by the court "not because the parties them-
selves are legislators, but simply because this is the result demanded by the choice-of-rule of the
forum." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1971). See infra
note 6.
Scholars have demonstrated that party autonomy has long been used by the courts, even in the
American system, despite the efforts of the treatise writers to make lex loci contractus the univer-
sal rule of contract choice of law. See Yntema, Contract and Conflict of Laws: 'Autonomy' in
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a position in English law and elsewhere. 4 Today, this is embodied in Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Law section 187, which expressly pro-
vides that when the parties explicitly choose a law to govern their
contractual rights and duties, that law will be applied, subject to certain
specific limitations.5
In interpreting section 187, the courts generally give deference to the
parties' choice, thereby furthering the underlying goal of contracts to en-
force the parties' bargain, and adding certainty and predictability to their
relationship.6 Yet, section 187 is increasingly applied in an almost mechan-
istic way, without due consideration given to the limitations on party
autonomy.
Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46 (1955); Prebble, Choice of Law to Determine the
Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of English and American Approaches to the Con-
flict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 433, 438-43, 496-501 (1973). But see Note, supra note 1
(arguing that the courts do not honor party autonomy where to do so would strip one of the
parties of the protective legislation of their own state).
4. W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 389 (1942); A.
LOWENFELD, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 242-
43 (1986). The leading English precedent is Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., 1939
A.C. 277; Collins, Contractual Obligation - The EEC Preliminary Draft Convention on Private
International Law, 25 INT'L. & CoMP. L. Q. 35 (1976) ("In principle, in most countries parties
may freely choose the law to govern their contract."); Yntema, 'Autonomy' in Choice of Law, I
AM. J. COMP. LAW 341, 345-353 (1952).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1977). The Restatement
states, in part: Law of the State Chosen by the Parties
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties
will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an
explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental pol-
icy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be
the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1977):
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified expectations of the parties
and to make it possible for them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and
liabilities under the contract. These objectives may best be attained in multistate transac-
tions by letting the parties choose the law to govern the validity of the contract and the
rights created thereby. In this way, certainty and predictability of result are most likely to
be secured.
Id. See also Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and Direction for the Future, 16 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 22 (1977) (giving effect to the parties' choice "provides the best means of
assuring that the parties' expectations will be satisfied").
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This tendency is particularly notable in the area of franchise contracts,7
in which the franchisor often requires the franchisee's adherence to a form
contract which specifies the application of the law of a state other than the
state in which the franchisee is located. The result of these choice of law
clauses is often to deprive the franchisee of protective legislation, specifi-
cally enacted by the franchisee's own legislature for the purpose of address-
ing the imbalance in bargaining power between the franchisor and
franchisee, and to protect the franchisee from what the legislature deems to
be unfair or coercive tactics by the franchisor. By honoring the choice of
law clause, courts have allowed the franchisor, through the fiction of the
franchisee's "consent," to opt out of the protective legislation expressly
designed to protect the franchisee. As a result, the legislature is divested of
its ability to regulate the franchise relationship.
This article's purpose is to demonstrate that, just as party autonomy is
not always the pre-eminent concern of contract law, it should not always be
the pre-eminent concern of confficts law in the contracts area. Rather,
there are numerous situations in which legislatures have made the determi-
nation that societal goals should take precedence over the parties' choice, or
that the parties are not free to make a reasoned, and free, choice because of
inequality in bargaining power. In these situations, just as substantive con-
tract law will not allow the contract to be enforced, conflicts of law should
not necessarily honor the choice by the parties. In the franchise area, in
particular, legislatures have made reasoned and deliberate determinations
that the contractual decisions made by the parties should not always be
enforced because of inequality in bargaining power. Thus, it is anomalous
for courts, in making choice of law decisions involving franchise contracts,
to automatically apply the law specified by the parties in that contract, re-
gardless of the expressed legislative considerations of interested
jurisdictions.
This article briefly reviews the structure of Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws section 187, and its application by the courts in the
franchise relationship. It suggests that section 187 inappropriately gives
preference to party autonomy over the mandatory policy of the most inter-
ested state by requiring the state to demonstrate that the policy is "funda-
mental." It further proposes that courts should always defer to the
7. A franchise is usually defined as a contractual relationship pursuant to which the fran-
chisee is granted the right to distribute goods or provide services under a marketing plan devel-
oped or suggested by the franchisor and the right to use a trademark, logo or advertising owned
by the franchisor, in return for a fee. See MODEL FRANCHISE INVESTMENT ACT § 3(g) (N. Am.
Sec. Admin. Ass'n. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.01 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 31005 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-3 (West 1989).
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mandatory policy of the most interested state unless the court concludes
that the needs of the interstate or international system for consistency and
predictability outweigh the most interested state's need to enforce that pol-
icy in the case before it. In the franchise context, in particular, this article
suggests that the state's interest in protecting franchisees from overreaching
by franchisors, and from termination without "good cause," is generally not
outweighed by any of the needs for consistency, predictability, or uniform-
ity in the interstate or international system.
II. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS SECTION 187
Section 187 clearly and explicitly adopts the principle of party auton-
omy. The section draws a distinction between those types of issues which
lie within the parties' power to determine, and those which ordinarily do
not.8 Paragraph one concerns those matters which the parties are generally
considered to have the power to determine by contractual agreement.' For
example, determinations as to the time of delivery, the method of delivery,
transfer of title, and the risk of loss are matters on which the parties are
generally free to determine on their own. Paragraph one, in essence, states
that, as to these matters, the parties may choose whatever law they wish to
govern these issues." By choosing such a law, the parties are merely adopt-
ing a body of rules rather than spelling out each separate rule on their own.
As to these issues, the power of the parties to so designate such a law should
be beyond dispute.1
8. One commentator, in analyzing English choice of law and the Rome Convention, see infra
notes 34-37 and accompanying text, distinguished between thejus dispositivum, which is law that
fills the gaps for the parties as to matters which are within their power to decide and the jus
cogens, which is mandatory law as to which the parties are not free to evade. In choosing ajus
cogens, the parties choice is essentially irrelevant "for it is the essence ofjus cogens that it over-
rides the parties' choice." Jaffey, The English Proper Law Doctrine and the EEC Convention, 33
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 543 (1984). Weintraub has drawn a similar distinction between the law
which determines the validity of provisions of a contract, and the law which simply provides rules
of construction for provisions which are within the power of the parties to decide, but which they
have left ambiguous or unarticulated. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at § 7.2, at 362-63.
9. See sources cited supra note 6.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment c (1971).
11. Professor Reese, and the comments to Restatement (Second), suggest that this issue "has
never been doubted." See Id.; Reese, supra note 6, at 22-23; Reese, Contracts and the Restatement
of Conflict of Law, Second, 9 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 531, 534 (1960). However, much of the early
debate over party autonomy revolved around its applicability, even as to issues within the parties'
control. For example, Walter Wheeler Cook, in discrediting the vested rights theory, provided
examples from situations where the parties were free, under the applicable law, to modify their
relationship. In each case the parties were simply displacing rules which were presumed in the
absence of an express agreement. W. COOK, supra note 4, at 393-401. All of these examples are
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While it may seem obvious, recognition of this right of choice is ex-
tremely important. As Professor Reese, Reporter for the Restatement (Sec-
ond), has pointed out, most contract terms are within the realm of
paragraph one.2 Moreover, it is likely that when parties place a choice of
law clause in their contract, they are undoubtedly thinking about its appli-
cation primarily to issues which would arise under paragraph one. Lawyers
rarely place choice of law clauses in contracts to evade the mandatory law
of one of the states with which the contract is associated. In fact, lawyers
rarely insert choice of law clauses with a particular legal issue in mind.
Parties choose a particular law for two reasons: First, they prefer a
legal system with which they are familiar, and in which they have general
confidence; second, they inflexibly opt for the system where they reside or
do business. 3 Thus, the particular law chosen is rarely based on a deep
understanding or knowledge of the law as to all, or even most, of the is-
sues14 that might arise out of the contractual relationship. Rather, it is
based upon "a vaguely felt preference for dealing with what appears to be
familiar rather than with the unfamiliar."' 5 If there are gaps left in the
support only for the proposition, expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§ 187(1) that the parties may incorporate any law in their contract to express, in a shorthand way,
terms which they are generally free to choose under any applicable state's law.
The rub comes when the chosen law conflicts with a mandatory rule of an interested state.
When Cook finally addressed that issue, his comments became tentative and seemed to imply
considerable deference to the public policy of states with a close connection to the transaction.
For example, in an attempt to explain what Lord Wright meant in the Vita Foods decision, that
the parties' choice must be "bona fide and legal," Cook stated:
In the case of a common carrier [for example], it is obvious that an attempt to limit the
carrier's liability by express words may and not infrequently does run counter to the de-
clared public policy of one or more of the states with which the transaction has a substan-
tial connection. In such cases what (for want of a better term) is called "international (or
interstate) comity" would suggest that if the question arises in some neutral state (i.e., one
with which the transaction has no substantial connection) the courts there ought not to aid
the carrier in evading the public policy of the state or states concerned.
W. COOK, supra note 5, at 426. The only examples Cook gave in which the law of the parties'
choosing would override mandatory law involved trivial and anachronistic laws of the place con-
tracting (such as laws prohibiting the signing of contracts on Sunday), not mandatory law of a
state with which the contract was closely connected. Id. at 427-31.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment c (1977); Reese, supra,
note 11, at 534.
13. Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements: New York's Approach, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 325 (1979).
14. Indeed, the choice of law clause may not be negotiated or considered at all. See Com-
ment, The Choice of Law in Commercial Relations: A German Perspective, 37 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 935, 937 (1988) ("Many German companies, even those with large legal departments, often
subject their contracts to a foreign legal system - without much, and often without any legal
research into the foreign law.").
15. Gruson, supra note 13, at 325.
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contract, the attorney wants them filled by the law she is most familiar
with. By making it clear that the parties may choose a particular law which
will cover all of these issues, the rule insures considerable certainty in con-
tractual relationships.
Paragraph two, on the other hand, deals with issues which are not nor-
mally within the power of the parties to contract. It is here that we come to
the ultimate paradox of section 187. While it is true that contract law is
designed to insure the enforceability of the parties' choice, section 187(2)
deals explicitly with issues which at least one interested jurisdiction has not
left to party autonomy. Thus, the idea of deferring to party autonomy on
matters that the legislature does not normally allow to be resolved by pri-
vate agreement creates an inherent contradiction.
Nonetheless, recognizing that jurisdictions may disagree as to how a
matter may be handled, the drafters of section 187 allowed the parties to
choose a law, even as to matters on which the law of at least one state will
not allow them to agree, so long as: (1) the law chosen has some substantial
relationship to the transaction or there is another reasonable basis for their
choice; and (2) the application of a law chosen would not be "contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than
the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which,
under the rule of section 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties."' 6 In other words, the
parties could evade what might otherwise be the applicable law, so long as
they chose a law which had some reasonable relationship to the transaction,
and so long as they did not displace a mandatory law which was fundamen-
tal to the state imposing it, where that state had a materially greater interest
in applying its law than the state whose law the parties chose.
Unfortunately, neither Professor Reese, nor the Restatement itself, pro-
vide any clear definition as to what might be a "fundamental policy of the
state."' 7 The comments to the Restatement advise, however, that the policy
"must in any event be a substantial one,"' 8 and suggest that formalities
such as statutes of fraud, or anachronistic laws, will rarely be found to im-
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) supra note 5.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971) (No de-
tailed statement can be made of the situations where a "fundamental" policy of the state of the
otherwise applicable law will be found to exist.). See also, Reese, supra note 11, at 536:
The forum will only deny effect to a choice of law provision in order to protect what in
its view is an important interest or, in the language of the draft, "a fundamental policy" of
the State of the otherwise governing law. Unfortunately, existing authority provides few
clues as to what considerations will guide the forum in determining whether a given policy
is.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971).
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plicate fundamental interests. 19 On the other hand, laws which make cer-
tain kinds of contracts illegal, or which are designed to protect parties from
the "oppressive use of superior bargaining power," may well embody funda-
mental policies.20
The term "fundamental policy," as used in section 187, should not be
confused with the term "public policy" often used in choice of law cases to
justify a forum's rejection of foreign law. Traditionally, the forum has re-
served, to itself, the right to reject application of the law dictated by partic-
ular choice of law rules if that law is truly abhorrent to the fundamental
policy of the forum. The occasion for use of such a doctrine should be
rare.21 However, courts in the past have used public policy to evade unjust
results dictated by mechanical choice of rules under the Restatement (First),
and as a substitute for honest choice of law analysis.22 Section 187, how-
ever, is giving deference to the policy of the most interested state, not to the
policy of the forum. The Restatement (Second), in general, and most mod-
em choice of law theories, view the public policy behind the law of all inter-
ested states as a relevant factor in the choice of law analysis.23 Thus, to be
"fundamental," a policy need not be as strong as that which would justify a
forum, qua forum, to refuse to entertain a foreign cause of action.24
The Restatement also makes it clear that the closer the connection the
transaction has to an interested state, the less fundamental such an interest
need be.25 Obviously, as the interested state's connection with the transac-
tion becomes weaker, the need to justify the imposition of that state's law,
in contravention of the parties' interest, becomes greater. More specifically,
if the interests sought to be furthered by that state's law are not in fact
furthered by its application to the specific case, there is no reason for the
forum to reject the parties' choice in favor of that law.26 Thus, for example,
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 172 A. D. 227, 159 N.Y.S. 282 (1916), rev'd 224 N.Y. 99,
120 N.E. 198 (1918).
22. Paulsen & Sovern,'Public Policy' on the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
24. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 544-45.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971).
26. See Jaffey, supra note 8.
It is easy to see that, in deciding whether a mandatory rule of a particular legal system
should be applied to an international contract, the links which the contract has with the
country in question are material. If the mandatory rule in issue is designed to protect the
public interest in some way, then it may well be that that interest can only be injured if a
particular performance is to take place in the country. Or, if the public interest can be
damaged by an act performed outside the country, as with rules designed to protect the
economy of the country, questions may arise as to the justice of invalidating the contract,
1990]
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an Ohio law requiring good cause before a franchisee may be terminated
should not be applied in a case involving an Ohio franchisor and a New
Jersey franchisee, where the parties have expressly chosen New Jersey law
to govern their contract. Section 187 expresses this point when it refers to
the fundamental policy of a state which has "a materially greater interest
than the chosen state" in the particular issue at hand.27
The limiting of party autonomy by the policy determinations of an in-
terested state is not unique to American law. English law also limits party
autonomy. It is generally accepted in English law that the proper law of the
contract is the law chosen by the parties, either expressly or impliedly, and
that any such choice is valid and conclusive.2" Yet, statements of the rule
have always been conditioned by the requirement that the parties' choice
"must be bona fide and legal."'29 What is meant by these terms has never
been made clear, yet they imply that the parties may not "evade" the
mandatory provisions of the law with which the contract is most closely
connected."a In other words, parties are not allowed to evade important
public policy determinations made by the legislature of a particularly inter-
ested state. At least where Acts of Parliament are at issue, English courts
have applied such laws relating to important social issues without regard to
the proper law of the contract.31 Moreover, in at least one significant deci-
sion, the House of Lords has deferred to the mandatory law of India in
so as to deprive a party who has no connections with the country of his bargain. Whether
it is just to do so may be thought to depend on whether the contract's links with the
country, in its making or performance or the situation of the subject-matter, are such as to
put him on notice that the law of that country might intervene.
Jaffe, supra note 8, at 538.
See also Weintraub, How to Choose Law for Contracts and How Not To: The EEC Convention,
17 TEX. INT'L. LJ. 155 (1982). (A state's mandatory rules which override the terms of a contract
should only apply where the contract will have social consequences in that state and only where
the law is not anachronistic or aberrational. The further away a contract is from international
commerce, the less need there is for uniformity and the greater the interest of the state.).
27. RESTATMEENT (SECOND), supra note 5.
28. Dicey & Morris, Conflicts of Law, 1161 (L. Collins, l1th ed.); Mann, The Proper Law in
the Conflict of Laws 36 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437, 444 (1987).
29. Dicey & Morris, supra note 28, at 1170. The qualification has its origin in the opinion of
Lord Wright in the landmark Vita Foods case. See Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping
Co., 1939 A.C. 277.
30. Dicey & Morris, supra note 28, at 1170-71. See also Mann, supra note 28, at 446. See
Williams, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 35 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 1, 11-12 (1986) (parties free to choose, subject to restrictions based on public policy
and requirement that the choice be bonafide and "legal").
31. Collins, supra note 4, at 49. See also Dicey & Morris, supra note 28, at 755-56 (citing cases
in which the parties' choice has not been honored for policy reasons).
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refusing to enforce a contract to be performed there, despite the parties'
apparent choice of English law. 2
The same significant limitation inheres in the law of most continental
countries,3 3 and is reflected in the European Economic Community's Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, otherwise
known as the Rome Convention.34 The Convention provides, in article 3,
paragraph 1, that a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the
parties. 35 Thus, at least as to matters which are within the contractual
power of the parties to determine, their choice of law shall be given conclu-
sive effect. However, article 3 must be read in conjunction with article 7,
paragraph 1, which provides that
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another
country with which the situation has a close connection, if, and inso-
far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be ap-
plied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules regard shall be had
to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their applica-
tion or non-application.36
Mandatory rules are defined as "rules of law of [a] country which cannot be
derogated from by contract. ' 37 Thus, party autonomy may give way to
mandatory rules of a country with which the situation has a close
connection.
The scope of article 7 depends, however, upon the meaning to be given
to ambiguous words of article 7(1). Read literally, that section seems to say
that, in order to override the parties' choice, the legislature of a closely
connected state must specify, or intend, that its law will apply regardless of
a choice of law provision. In other words, the legislature must intend to
32. Regazzoni v. K.C. Sethia Ltd., 1958 A.C. 301.
33. Most European Countries recognize the freedom of the contracting parties to choose the
law that will govern the agreement. E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY, 370-376 (1960); Lando, New American Choice of Law Principles and the European Con-
flict of Laws on Contracts, 30 AM. J. COMP.L. 19, 21-22 (1982).
However, a number of European countries will not recognize the choice of the parties where
that choice violates "imperative rules of the 'competent' law." E. RABEL, supra, at 375-76. The
European countries are also virtually unanimous in their refusal to recognize a choice made for
the purpose of evading the law of a particular country. Id. at 430.
34. EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 23 EUR. COMM. O.J.
No. L266 (1980).
35. "A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must be
expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the circum-
stances of the case. By their choice the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or a part
only of the contract." Id. at art. 3(1).
36. Id. at art. 7(1).
37. Id. at art. 3(3).
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make a choice of law rule, and direct the court to apply the domestic law of
that state over the law chosen by the parties.38 Under this interpretation,
the scope of article 7(1) becomes extremely limited, and applies only in
those rare cases where the legislature consciously deals with the interstate
contract.
The better reasoned interpretation, however, is that a rule need only be
"mandatory" in the domestic context in order for it to be honored in the
international context 9 (i.e., domestic contracts which contravene the law's
terms are deemed unenforceable). For example, all usury laws would be
"mandatory," as would a statute of frauds. Under this reading, article 7
becomes even more expansive than subparagraph (2)(b) of section 187.
Under the latter provision, the parties' choice must give way to contrary
law only if: (1) that law represents "fundamental policy;" (2) it is the law of
the state which has a materially greater interest as to that issue; and (3) it is
the law of the state which would be chosen in the absence of choice by the
parties. Article 7, in contrast, allows a court to give deference to the
mandatory law of a state which has a "close connection" to the "situa-
tion."'  Of course, deference to the mandatory rule is not automatic, and
the forum must consider the "nature and purpose" of such a rule, as well as
the "consequences" of its application, but the forum need not make the
rigid findings required by section 187.
The deep inroads that article 7 would make into the principle of auton-
omy were apparent to the drafters of the Convention, and, as a result, arti-
cle 7 has become the most controversial provision of the Convention.4
Critics have argued that it subverts the goals of simplicity and certainty in
contract law, and provides little guidance to lawyers and judges as to when
38. Prof. Cavers seemed to have accepted this interpretation in commenting on an earlier
draft of the article which read as follows:
Where a contract is also connected with a country other than the country whose law is
applicable under [any one of eight'articles prescribing choice-of-law rules] and the law of
that other country contains rules which govern the matter compulsorily in such a way that
they exclude the application of every other law, these rules shall be taken into account to
the extent that the exclusion is justifiable by the particular character and purpose of the
rules.
Cavers, The Common Market's Draft Conflicts Convention On Obligations: Some Preventative
Law Aspects, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 612-613 (1975). But see sources cited infra, note 39.
39. This seems to be the generally accepted interpretation. See e.g., Weintraub, supra note
26; Williams, supra note 30, at 22; Cavers has defined a "mandatory" rule, in the American choice
of law context, as one which would "invalidate any express provisions to the contrary in a wholly
domestic transaction." D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESs 196 (1965).
40. Cavers, supra note 38.
41. Williams, supra note 30, at 23.
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the parties' choice should give way to mandatory law.42 In fact, the United
Kingdom has expressed its intention to decline to adhere to article 7(1), as
it is permitted to do under article 22 of the Convention.43
The uncertainty present in the Rome Convention, however, was not cre-
ated by the drafters. It is the result of the inherent contradiction between
the concept of party autonomy, and the fact that contract law itself has
never recognized party autonomy as an absolute rule of construction. The
Convention has merely made explicit what had been an implicit tension in
all theories concerning party autonomy." Indeed, in two types of contracts
- the sale of consumer goods and employment contracts - the Conven-
tion expressly holds that the parties' choice of law will always give way to
mandatory rules.45
At least one commentator has suggested that a "rule" balancing party
autonomy with the legitimate protective interests of communal states can-
not be written, and the courts must simply weigh the competing interests on
a case-by-case basis. 46 This view may be correct in light of the mechanical,
or in some cases clearly erroneous, treatment given section 187 by the
courts.
III. PARTY AUTONOMY IN THE COURTS
While American courts have traditionally been more solicitous to party
autonomy than the scholars,47 they have long recognized that the principle
of party autonomy has its limitations. Thus, in certain areas where the
courts perceive the parties to have unequal bargaining power, or where the
courts recognize a legislative policy to override party autonomy, they have
not hesitated to reject choice of law clauses. In particular, courts have re-
fused to follow choice of law clauses where the contracts contravene poli-
cies relating to covenants not to compete, franchise dealership laws, usury
statutes, and consumer protection statutes, especially in the insurance
field.48
42. Collins, supra note 4, at 50.
43. Williams, supra note 30, at 24 n.57.
44. The Convention has also expressly rejected party autonomy with regard to the sale of
consumer goods. EEC Convention on the Law to Contractual Obligations, supra note 34, at art. 5.
45. Id. at art. 5 (consumer contracts), and art. 6 (individual employment contracts).
46. Nadelmann, Impressionism and Unifications of Law: The EEC Draft Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual Obligations, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 7-8
(1976).
47. See Yntema, supra note 3.
48. See Note, supra note 1, at 1672-73 nn.83-91.
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The courts have generally recognized that where the parties have une-
qual bargaining power such that one party may force upon the other party
unconscionable terms and conditions, that unequal bargaining power can-
not be legitimated or justified by the addition of a choice of law clause
which has also been forced upon the weaker party. If the efforts of a legisla-
ture to protect a party from such unequal bargaining power could be
avoided by merely opting for the application of another legislature's law,
then the choice of law clauses would come close to being what Professor
Beale accused them of being - the result of private parties making public
law.49 Thus, it would seem that in every case where the legislature made
mandatory rules which were to be applied regardless of the parties' individ-
ual choice, the parties' choice should be irrelevant.
Yet, there are situations where the mandatory rule should be ignored in
the interstate or international context. First, the state may not be interested
in enforcing the rule in an interstate or international context, especially
where application of the other state's law would not severely interfere with
the policy determinations of the interested state. For example, in the con-
text of usury, a state may invalidate a domestic contract which exceeds the
usury rate even by a small percentage, but it would not be particularly con-
cerned about the enforcement of an interstate contract providing for an in-
terest rate only slightly higher than a domestic rate yet still not
unconscionably high. ° Similarly, with regard to the statute of frauds, a
state's mandatory rule as to formality may be deemed to be inapplicable in
an interstate context where the contract complied with the rules of formal-
ity required by the laws of the state to which the parties expressly looked
for enforceability. In such a context, the domestic goals of formality give
way to the needs of the interstate system.
In contrast, where the policy interests of the most interested state are
directly implicated, and where the interstate or international character of
the contract does not diminish significantly the policy concerns, the ability
of the parties to opt out of such a policy determination should be severely
circumscribed.
Such an approach would not limit the usefulness of choice of law
clauses. As noted above, choice of law clauses are not used primarily to
evade mandatory rules. Rather, such clauses are placed into contracts by
the parties because they want potential gaps filled with the law with which
they are most familiar. They generally do not contemplate a specific issue
or contractual term when they opt for the law of their own jurisdiction.
49. See sources cited, supra note 3.
50. Trautman, supra note 1, at 552.
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The fact that parties do not contemplate specific advantages by referring
to a particular law is evidenced by the number of embarrassing cases in
which the parties have chosen a law which in fact invalidates one or more
clauses of the contract.5 1 This happens, not because the lawyers are incom-
petent, but because they have not considered the effect of the applicable law
on every possible issue. They have chosen that law simply because they
generally feel comfortable with it, and respect its judgment as to most issues
which they may confront. Thus, a policy of seriously questioning party
autonomy as it relates to mandatory rules of an interested jurisdiction does
not significantly reduce the predictability and certainty of the applicable
law as to most matters which may arise under the contract.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES IN THE FRANCHISE CONTEXT
There are probably few areas that better exemplify the tension between
party autonomy and legislative judgment than in the area of franchise rela-
tionships. Almost by definition, the franchise relationship involves inequal-
ity in bargaining power.5 2 Usually, the franchisor is a nationwide
manufacturer or holder of valuable goodwill in a trade name who contracts
with local entrepreneurs, of significantly less capital and sophistication, to
sell to them the right to use the franchisor's name, skill, technology, or
51. See eg., Foreman v. George Foreman Assoc., 517 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1975); Dep't of
Motor Vehicles v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 408 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
(Court enforced franchisor's choice of New Jersey law which invalidated a provision in the
franchisor-drafted contract); see also R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 371 n.30 (citing cases)
The authors of the Restatement (Second) suggest that when the parties choose a law that
invalidates the contract, "it can be assumed that they did so by mistake." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment e (1971). Professor Weintraub points to this com-
ment as proof that the § 187 is really nothing more than a partial rule of validation (I/e., apply the
law that enforces the parties' intentions, at least where they have chosen a validating law). Prof.
Weintraub suggests that the better rule would be to choose the validating law, whether or not the
parties happened to choose it. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 371-75.
52. The Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives characterized the
franchise relationship as follows:
Advantages of financial strength, access to information and to legal advice create a
gross disparity of bargaining power in favor of the franchisor and results [sic] in one-sided
franchise agreements that are offered, and generally accepted, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Throughout the relationship, the franchisor's ability to terminate a franchise, and with it a
franchisee's investment in potential livelihood, can easily become an ability to dictate a
court's behavior and compliance. Even after a franchise is terminated, a franchisee re-
mains at serious legal and financial disadvantage in attempting to seek redress in court.
HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, FRANCHISING IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: PROSPECTS AND
PROBLEMS 49, 101st CONG., 2D SESS., 101-04 (Comm. Print 1990).
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product in a limited market.53 Typically, these relationships are considered
to be governed by contracts of adhesion, unilaterally drafted by the
franchisor, and offered to the franchisee on a take it or leave it basis.14 The
contract normally sets a number of conditions upon the franchisee's per-
formance, including requirements as to the nature of the product sold, the
services provided, quality standards, sales quota, market coverage, and the
like.5 The franchisee, having made a substantial capital investment, is at
the whim of the franchisor, and cannot afford to end the relationship with-
out substantial loss. 6 Moreover, despite the substantial investment the
franchisee is required to make, the franchisor may specify that the contract
may be terminated at any time in the sole judgment of the franchisor,57
usually upon short notice or upon the occurrence of certain conditions,58
and usually as determined by the franchisor's unilateral judgment.59
The superior bargaining power held by franchisors has led to the enact-
ment at the federal level of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act,6° which
requires the franchisor to act in good faith in the performance of the agree-
ment, or in the termination, or refusal to renew the agreement. Similar
concerns led to the enactment of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, or
PMPA,6 1 which protects local gasoline retailers from unfair termination of
petroleum franchises by the major oil companies.
53. H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 1.02(2) (1985); see also G.
GLICKMAN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: FRANCHISING § 2.02, at 2-9 to -10 (1990)(for the difini-
tion of 'franchise' adopted by the FTC).
But see Pitegotf, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. LAW. 289,
315 (1989) (arguing that there is much less inequality in bargaining power today than in the 1960s
and 1970s because prospective franchisees are often large, sophisticated businesses with a number
of franchise options to choose from and many franchisors are small businesses).
54. H. BROWN, supra note 53, at § 1.03(3).
In recognition of the need for uniformity, efficiency and control, franchise agreements have
become highly standardized contracts. There is generally little opportunity to negotiate or
to alter contract provisions or requirements, particularly for first-time franchisees. A
number of potentially disadvantageous provisions have been incorporated in the agree-
ments of most franchisors.
HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 101st Cong. 2D SEss., supra note 52, at 49-50.
55. Id. at §§ 2.01-03.
56. Id. at § 1.05(3); Note, Regulation of Franchising, MINN. L. REv. 1027, 1034-35 (1975).
57. H. BROWN, supra note 53, at § 7.04(1)-(2).
58. Id. at § 12.07(1)(a).
59. Id. at §§ 7.04(1)-(2).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1988).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1988).
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These concerns have also led to the enactment of protective legislation
in a number of states.62 Approximately fifteen states have enacted a variety
of measures to protect franchisees,63 including laws requiring full disclosure
of certain facts before a franchise relationship is created," preventing termi-
nation of the relationship by the franchisor without adequate notice,65 al-
lowing for an opportunity to cure any defects,66 and demanding a showing
of good cause.67 Recognizing the franchisee's weak bargaining power, most
of these states have also mandated that these protective measures may not
be abrogated by contract.68
62. Pitegoff, supra note 53, at 314 ("Franchise relationship laws are based on legislative find-
ings of an inequality of bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees, and of abuses by
franchisors.").
63. See H. BROWN, supra note 53, at §§ 7.01-.08; Emerson, Franchising and the Collective
Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1151 n. 27 (1990); Note, supra note 56, at 1036.
For an excellent and concise summary of the various state franchise laws, see Pitegoff, supra note
53.
64. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31110-24. (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 482E-3 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, para. 1716 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE
ANN. § 23-2-2.5-9 (Burns 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80C.02-05 (West 1986); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1334.02 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-5A-6
(1986 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.100.040-080 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 553.22 (West 1990).
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-204 (1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20020 (West 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 424-133f, 1331 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2554 (1975);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1202 (Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STATE. § 482E-6 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
cl. 1211, para. 1719 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. 23-2-2.7-3 (Burns 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. 80C.14 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. 74.24-53 (Supp. 1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 407.405 (Vernon 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. 87-404 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:10-5 (West 1989); V. CODE ANN. tit. 12A, § 131 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.,
§ 19.100.180 (1989).
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-204(d); CAL BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20021 (West 1987); HAW.
REV. STAT. 482E-6(H); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, §§ 1719(b) (Smith-Hurd Sups. 1989); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.1800)(1988).
67. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-204(1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20020; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42-133f, 42-1331 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552 (1975 & Supp.
1988); D.C. CODE ANN. 29-1202; HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121§ , para.
1741 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80C.14; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.413
(Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-404; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56A:10-5; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 278(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-5.3 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. tit.
12A, § 132 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.180 (1989).
68. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 4-72-206 (1987); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20010 (West 1987);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f, 1331 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2552(1975);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 482E-6 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211, § 1741 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989);
MINN. STAT. ANN. (1985) § 80c.21 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. para. 87-406
(1987): OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1334.15 (Anderson Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. LAWS ANN. tit. 10,
§ 278(c) (Purdon 1978 & Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.100.220 (1989).
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Recognizing the strong public policy behind these franchise protection
statutes, 69 a number of decisions"0 have rejected choice of law clauses in
franchise agreements which would have allowed the franchisor to evade the
public policy of the franchisee's state by designating the law of a state which
would embrace the contract as written.71 Yet, some recent decisions, pur-
69. See, e.g., The Emergency Clause of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act which provides
in part:
The legistature finds and declares that distribution and sale of franchise agreements in
the State of Arkansas vitally affects the general economy of the State, public interest and
public welfare; that franchisors as described in this Act, for adequate fees have licensed
Arkansas corporations and citizens to use the trade names and formulas; and that in some
instances, franchisors collect advertising fees from franchisees which are not expended for
advertising purposes; and that some franchisors have, without good cause and to the great
prejudice and harm of the citizens of the State of Arkansas, cancelled exisiting franchise
agreements and that other such cancellations are threatened; and that only by the immedi-
ate passage of this Act can this situation be remedied.
1977 Ark. Acts 355, § 13J.
The New Jersey legislature made the following findings:
The Legislature finds and declares that distribution and sales through franchise ar-
rangements in the State of New Jersey vitally affects the general economy of the State, the
public interest and the public welfare. It is therefore necessary in the public interest to
define the relationship and responsibilities of franchisors and franchisees in connection
with franchise arrangements.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-2 (West 1989).
70. See, e.g., Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990); Solman Dis-
trib., Inc. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 888 F2d 170 (1st Cir. 1989); Southern Int'l Sales v. Potter &
Brumfield Civ. of AMF Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Business Incentives
Co., Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp. 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that parties' choice of
New York law should not apply, given New Jersey's interest in the protection of "small business-
men from more powerful commercial giants," but concluding that New Jersey's franchise law
was, by its own terms, inapplicable under the facts); Winer Motors, Inc. v. Jaguar Rover Triumph
Inc., 208 N.J. Super. 666, -, 506 A.2d 817, 820 (App. Div. 1986) (If such choice of law clauses
were honored "any large home state's law, could with a stroke of a pen remove the beneficial effect
of the franchises's state's remedial legislation."); Bush v. National School Studios, Inc., 139 Wis.
2d 635, 407 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1987); Colt Indus. Inc., v. Fidelco Pump & Compressor Corp., 700
F. Supp. 1339 (D. N. J. 1987) (parties' choice of New York law does not deprive New Jersey and
Connecticut distributors benefits under their respective state's franchise protection laws; court
concludes, however, that the distributors are not franchisors under the laws.).
71. The House Committee on Small Business recognized the ability of franchisors to use
choice of law and choice of forum clauses to evade a franchisee's statutory protections:
While justified as necessary for maintaining uniformity within a franchise system, and
seemingly harmless on paper, contractual choice of law and venue requirements can be
extremely detrimental to franchises who seek to initiate legal actions against a franchisor.
These provisions virtually guarantee that any legal proceeding will be undertaken in a
jurisdiction that is distant and inconvenient for the franchisee and under laws that are
more favorable for the franchisor. In some instances, franchisees, have found that the
applicabale law or jurisiction effectively barrs them from legal actions by denying legal
standing to non-residents. Of equal significance from a policy perspective is the use of
contractual choice of law and venue provisions by franchisors to circumvent the due pro-
cess guarantees provided franchisees in the laws of other states and to avoid liability or
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porting to rely expressly upon Restatement section 187(2), have enforced
such choice of law clauses so as to exempt the franchisor from the applica-
tion of legislation designed expressly to protect franchisees.72 In three re-
cent cases, federal courts have so fundamentally misconstrued section 187,
and the subtle balancing reflected therein, that their reasoning needs to be
analyzed in some detail.
In Tele-Save Merchandising v. Consumers Distributing. Co.," the
franchise relationship was between an Ohio corporation, Tele-Save, with its
principal place of business in Columbus, Ohio, and a Canadian franchisor,
Consumers, which operated a large chain of catalogue showrooms. Ac-
cording to their agreement, Tele-Save would operate one such catalogue
showroom in Columbus. The agreement provided that it would be con-
strued in accordance with the laws of New Jersey, where Consumers had an
office. In 1982, some six months after the relationship was established,
Consumers notified Tele-Save that it was cancelling its program. Tele-Save
asked Consumers to reimburse it for the cost of the merchandise it
purchased pursuant to the agreement, and Consumers' refusal prompted
the initiation of the lawsuit.74 Tele-Save alleged that Consumers violated
prosecution in jurisdictions where specific contract provision or actions may be violations
of the law.
HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BusiNEss, 101ST CONG., supra note 53.
72. See Commercial Property Investments, Inc. v. Quality Inns Int., - F.2d - (8th Cir.
1991); Modem Computer Sys., v. Modem Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989); Tele-
Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib Co., Ltd., 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987); Carlock
v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989); Sheldon v. Munford Inc., 660 F. Supp. 130
(N.D. Ind. 1987). One commentator has suggested that the Modern Computer and Tele-Save
decisions are part of a trend of decisions narrowly construing state franchise protection laws "per-
haps in response to an increased awareness of the problems created by these laws." Pitegoff, supra
note 53, at 318. See also United Wholesale Liquor Co. v. Brown-Forman Distillers Co., 108 N.M.
467, 775 P.2d 233 (1989) (The court relied upon U.C.C. § 1-105(1)(1990) (N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 55-1-105(1)(1987 & Supp. 1990)) to allow the parties to remove their franchise contract from
the ambit of New Mexico's distributor-protective Alcoholic Beverage Franchise Act (N. M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-8A-7, to -8)(1987)). Section 1-105(1) provides in part that: "when a transaction
bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree
that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation, shall govern their rights and
duties."
Concluding that a distributorship contract was a contract for the sale of goods, the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court held that § 1-105(1) applied, that the parties could opt for the application of
another state's law and that therefore the New Mexico distributor was deprived of the "good
cause" termination protections of the New Mexico franchise act (N. M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-8
(1987)). Surely, however, § 1-105(l) was meant to determine choice of law for those substantive
issues addressed by the New Mexico version of the Uniform Commercial Code (which speaks not
at all to franchise termination) and was not designed to apply to issues handled more directly by
other statutory provisions, such as the Alcoholic Beverage Franchise Act.
73. 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987).
74. Id. at 1121.
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Ohio's Business Opportunity Plans Act75 by failing to make certain written
disclosures with regard to sales potential, by making false and misleading
statements, by accepting a down payment in excess of that which the law
allows, and by failing to follow certain procedures before cancellation. 76
Consumers moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Ohio act
did not apply.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in applying Ohio choice of
law principles,77 relied specifically upon Restatement (Second) section
187(2). The court first determined that the Ohio act did not supercede the
parties' choice of New Jersey law because the act did not represent a "fun-
damental state policy."'78 Acknowledging that there was no hard and fast
rule under the Restatement to determine what is fundamental, the court
stated that the Restatement suggests that "courts may consider a policy
'fundamental' when a large number of significant contacts are grouped in
the forum state as opposed to the chosen state."79 Since the court con-
cluded that the "contacts are fairly evenly divided between New Jersey and
Ohio," the underlying policy was not considered to be fundamental. 80
There are several errors in the court's analysis. First, the Restatement
(Second) does not say that the number of contacts are relevant to determin-
ing whether a policy is fundamental. Indeed, the comments say almost the
opposite. The comments state that the greater the contacts, the less funda-
mental the policy need be.81 The Sixth Circuit misconstrued this point by
concluding that the importance of the state policy depended upon the
number of contacts that the particular case had with the jurisdiction. As a
matter of pure logic, the fundamental nature of a state's policy has nothing
to do with the number of contacts a particular case has with the jurisdic-
tion. Policy and contacts are independent variables.
Second, it is simply not true that the contacts were evenly divided be-
tween New Jersey and Ohio. Again, the court exhibited a basic misunder-
standing of the subtle balancing involved in section 187(2). The franchise
which was the subject of the dispute was centered in Ohio. If it succeeded
or failed, the impact would have been felt in Ohio. Little impact, if any,
75. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1334.01-.99 (Anderson Supp. 1989).
76. Tele-Save, 814 F.2d at 1121-22.
77. Federal courts sitting in cases based upon diversity of citizenship must follow the choice
of law principles of the state in which they sit, with regard to substantive issues of law. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
78. Tele-Save, 814 F.2d at 1123.
79. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment g (1971)).
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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would be felt in New Jersey. Moreover, even if the physical contacts were
considered to be equal, Ohio had a significantly greater interest in this
transaction than New Jersey. Since the franchisor had some contact with
New Jersey, that state was generally interested in the enforceability of the
franchisor's contracts. However, New Jersey had not exhibited, through
special legislation, any particular interest in this relationship.82 On the
other hand, Ohio had indicated a strong legislative intent to override party
autonomy in the context of franchise relationships, especially those rela-
tionships which adversely affect Ohio entrepreneurs. Thus, it is clear,
under any form of interest analysis, that Ohio had a significantly greater
interest than New Jersey in the application of its law.
Next, noting that a statute may reflect fundamental policy when it is
designed to protect a person from oppressive superior bargaining power, the
court found that the "parties to this contract were not of unequal bargain-
ing strength."83 While such a conclusion is factually suspect,84 it is also
irrelevant. If Tele-Save met the definition of a franchisee as set forth in the
Ohio statute, it seems at least questionable for the court to deprive Tele-
Save of the specific benefits of the statute based upon its own conclusion
that Tele-Save did not need the protection that the Ohio statute specifically
sought to afford to it.
Certainly, the court should have determined whether Ohio's domestic
interests were implicated under the specific facts before it, and then rejected
Ohio's mandatory rule if the domestic interest were slight and the interests
of the interstate system were great. Nevertheless, the court should not have
been able to remove protection from parties clearly within the class of those
intended to be protected by the rule on the basis of the court's conclusion
that such parties do not need protection.
The court also failed to articulate why evasion of Ohio franchise law
was essential to the interstate system. It would not be unfair to Consumers
to subject it to the same rules applicable to all other franchisors which have
82. In fact, New Jersey has enacted protective legislation for New Jersey franchisees similar
to that enacted by Ohio and the New Jersey legislature. It has made a legislative finding that
familiar arrangements in New Jersey (i.e., those invoking New Jersey franchisors) "vitally" affect
New Jersey's economy. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56.10-2 (West 1989). In contrast, New Jersey has
not enacted any special legislation for New Jersey franchisees doing business in other states. It is,
therefore, reasonable to assume that both New Jersey and Ohio would expect their franchisors to
be subject to the franchisee-protective legislation of each state.
83. Tele-Save Merchandising Co., 814 F. 2d 1123 (6th Cir. 1987).
84. "Consumers was one of the largest chains of catalog showroom operations in the United
States and Canada, while Tele-Save, having been capitalized with only a $150,000 investment, was
seriously undercapitalized .... This gross disproportionality in economic strength is not indica-
tive of equal bargaining power." Id. at 1125 n.2 (Milburn, J., dissenting).
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local franchisees in Ohio. It is also incongruous to suggest that the Ohio
legislature would be willing to deprive franchisees of the protections of the
act simply because the franchisors are from outside the state. The domestic
Ohio interest is not diminished by that fact.85
Finally, the court concluded that even if the Ohio statute represented
fundamental public policy, Tele-Save had failed to show that it could not
achieve a similar remedy under New Jersey law. Yet, in reaching such a
determination, the court pointed to nothing in the New Jersey statutes or
common law, which could provide the type of relief which would be avail-
able to Tele-Save under the Ohio statute.8 6 Moreover, as the dissent
pointed out, a New Jersey claim based upon common law fraud would
clearly not provide relief under the facts presented. 7
Relying expressly upon Tele-Save, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modern Banking Systems,
Inc, 88 also divested a franchisee of the express protections granted by its
own state's franchise protection laws by enforcing a choice of law provision
in the franchise contract. This court, like the court in Tele-Save, held that
the franchisee possessed sufficient bargaining power when it signed the dis-
tribution agreement and therefore did not need the protection of the
franchise arrangement.89 Again, such a conclusion was factually suspect,
and legally irrelevant.
The Eighth Circuit also followed the error of the Sixth Circuit by con-
cluding that Minnesota, the place of incorporation of the franchisee and its
sole place of business, had no greater contacts with the action than Ne-
85. The dissent argued that, in fact, the Ohio legislature had made an express choice of law
decision by specifying that the act was applicable to "any claim arising from the sale or lease of a
business opportunity plan" in Ohio. Id. at 1126 n.3 (Milburn, J., dissenting) (citing OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1334.10(A) (Anderson 1979)). The majority correctly rejected this argument.
Tele-Save, 814 F.2d at 1123-24. Sweeping language, like that used in the Ohio ordinance, rarely
evidences legislative attention to the application of domestic law in a conflicts situation. Only
when the legislature specifically makes a choice of law designation is a court of that state bound to
follow the legislative directive. If the legislature were asked to make such a choice, however, it
would undoubtedly choose to apply the act to all Ohio franchises.
In fact, the state of Minnesota made such an express legislative determination within months
of the Modern Computer decision by providing that any contractual agreement "including any
choice of law provision" contrary to the act was void. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 806.21 (1990 Supp.).
86. In fact, the New Jersey counterpart to the Ohio law applies only to New Jersey franchis-
ees. See supra notes 62-68 and infra note 96 and accompanying text.
87. Tele-Save, 814 F.2d at 1125 n.2 (Milburn, J. dissenting)
88. 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc decision vacating 858 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1988)).
89. Id. at 739.
90. The franchisee began as a two-person "start up" operation selling computer systems to
financial institutions. Although it purchased software from a number of vendors, over 70 percent
of its business was dependent upon defendant franchisor. Id.
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braska, the state of incorporation of the franchisor, the site where the agree-
ment was signed, the site of the negotiation, and the principle place of
business of the franchisor. 91 Such a numerical weighing of contacts, with-
out a consideration of the significance of the contacts, as related to the in-
terests of the affected states, demonstrates once again a fundamental lack of
understanding by the court of the subtle balancing required by section 187.
In yet a third error, the Eighth Circuit concluded, without citation to
authority, that "some evidence of oppressive, unreasonable or unfair use of
superior bargaining position, as in a contract of adhesion, is required before
a court can justifiably disregard a mutually agreed upon choice of law
clause."92 Finding that such "extreme circumstances" did not exist in the
case before it, the court saw no reason to override the choice of law clause.
However, the Restatement (Second) does not require the showing of a con-
tract of adhesion in order to reject the choice made by the parties. Indeed,
choice of law clauses in contracts of adhesion may be enforced, so long as
they are not obviously unfair, or lead to a substantial injustice.93
It is not the lack of bargaining power per se that should invalidate a
choice of law clause. Rather, it is the fact that a particularly interested state
has taken a strong policy position with regard to a particular issue either
because of concern for lack of bargaining power, or because of other in-
dependent policy concerns, which induce the legislature to reject party au-
tonomy. Thus, while the existence of oppressive or unreasonable use of
superior bargaining power may invalidate a particular contract, its absence
in a particular case does not automatically require the enforcement of that
choice of law clause, where the legislature has made a determination that
party autonomy is not to be honored.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit suggested that there is no true conflict be-
tween the policies of Nebraska and Minnesota because Minnesota also has a
"traditional willingness to enforce parties' choice of law agreements. 94
While it is true that Minnesota, like most states, has a traditional willing-
ness to enforce the parties' choice of law agreements, that fact is entitled to
little weight in a context where the Minnesota legislature has expressly
made an exception to the general rule of party autonomy.
91. Id. at 739.
92. Id.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment b (1977); See P.
CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 195 (1965) (Choice of law clauses in adhesion contracts
should be honored unless it would subject a party "to oppressive or otherwise unfair conditions or
requirements." Id. at 195); Sedler, The Contract Provisions of the Restatement (Second): An Anal-
ysis and Critique 72 COL. L. REV. 279, 291-92 (1972).
94. Modern Computer, 871 F.2d at 740.
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Relying upon both Tele-Save and Modern Computer, the federal district
court for the District of Minnesota in Carlock v. Pillsbury Co.95 also re-
jected application of the Minnesota Franchise Act to the claims of Minne-
sota franchisees of the Haagen-Dazs nationwide ice cream franchise system.
The franchise contract specified New York law, the state of incorporation
of one of the Haagen-Dazs corporate entities and the site of a number of
other franchisees. The court honored the clause because there was a rea-
sonable nexus to New York,96 and because of the purported need of the
franchisor to have one law govern all its franchise relationships. 97 Ac-
knowledging that the Minnesota act expressly invalidated any waiver of
rights under the act, the court simply concluded, without analysis, that ap-
plication of New York law, which provided no protection to the Minnesota
franchisees, "is not repugnant to Minnesota public policy."9 The court
also stated, ironically, that the disparity in bargaining power between the
parties was "not sufficient to justify disregarding their choice of law," given
the fact that many states had imposed various requirements on franchisors,
thereby justifying the franchisor in imposing uniform conditions ignoring
such requirements.99
Finally, the court guaranteed the franchisor the best of both worlds by
applying New York law, but denying the franchisees of any of the protec-
tions of New York law. The court held that New York's franchisee-protec-
tion law applied, by its terms, only to New York franchises."c° This
conclusion, although supported by some case law,101 is most certainly
95. 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989). The court applied Minnesota choice of law rules
which are based on LeFlar's "choice-influencing considerations." See R. LEFLAR & L. McDou-
GAL & R. FELIX, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 106 (4th ed. 1986). Yet, the court held that it
would reach the same result under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187. Car-
lock, 719 F. Supp. at 809 n.7.
96. Id. at 807-08.
97. Id. at 808.
98. Id. at 811.
99. Id.
100. Id at 810.
101. Accord Highway Equip. Co. v. Caterpillar Inc., 908 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1990)(court
honored choice of Illinois law, but denied Ohio dealer the protection of Illinois' Franchise Disclo-
sure Act); Peugeot Motors of America, Inc. v. Eastern Auto Distributors, 892 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 100 S.Ct 3242 (1990) (court honored choice of New York law, but denied
Virginia franchisee the protection of New York's Franchised Motor Vehicle Dealer Act); Bimel-
Walroth Co. v. Raytheon Co., 796 F.2d 840 (6th Cir. 1986)(clause providing for application of
Wisconsin law does not give distributor protection under Wisconsin's Fair Dealership Law, which
by its terms applies to dealerships located in Wisconsin); Gilchrist Mach. Co. v. Komatsu Am.
Corp., 601 F.Supp. 1192, 1200-1201 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (Court honored choice of California law set
forth in standardized franchise contract, yet denied franchisee the protective benefits of Califor-
nia's Franchise Relations Act). But see Department of Motor Vehicles v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
Am., Inc., 408 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court applied New Jersey franchise law to
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wrong. Although a state's franchisee protection law may apply, by its
terms, only to franchisees within that state, when the franchisor agrees to be
bound by the whole body of that state's law, it agrees that such protective
legislation will apply to the subject relationship. Having chosen that law,
the franchisor is bound by both that which is favorable, and that which is
unfavorable. 102 Since the underlying assumption of these cases is that the
parties should be generally free to choose the law that will govern them, it is
anomalous to conclude that the chosen law will not apply simply because
the legislature passing the chosen law only insisted upon its application
within that state. In essence, section 187 allows the parties, subject to the
limitations set forth in paragraph 2, to place themselves within the ambit of
New York law. The result of the Carlock court's reasoning, however, is
that the franchisee is deprived of the protections accorded under both New
York and Minnesota law.
The Carlock result also hinges upon the court's conclusion that Haagen-
Dazs had a need to deal with all its franchisees under one law, and that this
need for uniformity overrode Minnesota's fundamental policy in protecting
franchisees.1" 3 The need for uniformity, however, is hard to justify. All
companies operating in a national market recognize that there are differing
requirements"° in each state that they must comply with. Insurance com-
panies, for example, must comply with the regulations of fifty different state
insurance departments. Moreover, the requirements of the various
franchise acts are quite similar, or virtually identical, in their basic require-
ments. Additionally, even if the statutes have differences, those differences
benefit Florida franchisee since franchisor had sought application of New Jersey law in its con-
tract). "Since [franchisor], a New Jersey resident, contracted in New Jersey to have New Jersey
substantive law apply to it, it cannot now be heard to complain about the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the act." Id at 630.
102. See id. at 630.
103. Accord Capital Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Mcdonald's Corp., F.Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Because McDonald's enters into a substantial number of franchise agreements in various states,
it has an interest in having those agreeements governed by one body of law." Id. at 880. How-
ever, the franchisee was not a party to the action and the party opposing the franchisor did not
address the choice of law issue. Moreover, no franchisee-protective legislation was at issue.).
104. For example, in New York, the Secretary of State is the authorized agent for service of
process upon all corporations doing buisness in the State, and no one may do business in the State
without so authorizing the Secretary of State. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp.
1989). In California, service may be made upon the corporation through the Secretary of State,
only if no authorized agents can be located within the State. CAL. CORP. CODE. §§ 2110, 2111
(West 1977 & Supp. 1989). In Texas, the Secretary of State is the authorized agent for all business
organizations which do business in Texas but do not maintain a regular place of business or have a
designated agent for service. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon 1986). A
company conducting its business in all three of these states, which would not be unusual, must be
aware of these differing circumstances.
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would have little or no adverse impact on a national franchisor. When a
manufacturer must manufacture its product to comply with fifty different
safety laws, lack of uniformity can be disastrous. Yet, no undue burden is
placed on a franchisor by requiring good cause to terminate Minnesota
franchisees, but not New York franchisees. Of course, the ultimate irony of
the Carlock decision is that the court creates the disparity of treatment by
depriving Minnesota franchisees of the same protection that the New York
franchisees would receive through application of New York law. 105
V. REFORMULATING THE RULE OF PARTY AUTONOMY.
While these cases may be dismissed as containing numerous and obvi-
ous errors of interpretation of section 187, they are important because they
demonstrate two important problems with that rule. First, they demon-
strate the courts' willingness to use the section as an almost inflexible rule
rather than as a method of analysis. In this way, the courts ignore the
principal drafter's admonition that the Restatement (Second) is designed, at
the very least, not to mislead a court or a litigant "into believing that the
area is governed by well settled rules." 106 Section 187, as drafted, unfortu-
nately enables a court to mechanically apply the choice of the parties unless
the equities of the specific case compel the court to reject an obviously un-
fair result.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Restatement (Second) errs by di-
recting the decisionmaker's attention, not to a balancing between the policy
goals of the interested state and the interstate system, but rather to the
"fundamental" nature of the particular policy before it. However, it is not
the fundamental nature of the law which creates a conflict; it is the fact that
the rule is mandatory. As the EEC Convention recognizes, the dichotomy
is between giving full force and effect to the parties' choice, or giving effect
to the determination of the legislature of an interested state that party au-
105. However, compare Rosenberg v. Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146, (S.D.N.Y. 1989), a
case involving the same franchisor. The court, using New York choice of law rules, applied Mas-
sachusetts common law of fraud to a Massachusetts franchisee's claim against Haagan-Dazs. The
court avoided the parties' choice of New York law by concluding that choice of law clauses only
applied to contracts, and not tort claims. Such an approach is inconsistent with purposes of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1977). Where a party can demonstrate
that the need for interstate uniformity or certainty in contractual relationships outweighs an inter-
ested state's policy, the parties' choice should be honored. The need for certainty or uniformity
applies to the entire relationship; it matters not whether its plaintiff's claim is classified as tort or
contract. Allowing the choice of law result to turn on the label "contract" or "tort" is reminiscent
of the mechanical rules of the Restatement (First). See Kozyris, supra note 2.
106. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement (Second), 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
679, 681 (1963).
[Vol. 74:57
CHOICE OF LAW CLA USES
tonomy is not to apply to the particular facts before it. Whether the forum
defers to the parties or to the legislature depends upon a weighing of the
importance of a particular state's interest, and its degree of connection to
the litigation against the interstate system's need for certainty, predictabil-
ity, and fairness to the parties. This weighing must take place whenever the
parties have chosen a law which conflicts with a mandatory rule of one of
the interested states. The Restatement (Second), however, creates an artifi-
cial and unprecedented precondition of a finding of a "fundamental" policy
before the forum can even engage in such a balancing.
The Restatement (Second) also fails to delineate how the balancing be-
tween party autonomy and the "fundamental" policies of the interested
state is to be accomplished. Other scholars and judges have attempted to
fill in the gap. Professor Weintraub suggests that the further away a con-
tract is from international commerce, the less the need for uniformity and
predictability, and the greater the interest of the state in enforcing its own
domestic policy. 17 Obviously, where a party to a contract has a particular
need for uniformity across a number of jurisdictions, that party should be
able to set a uniform policy relatively free from the restrictions of the indi-
vidual states.108
In most interstate contractual situations, however, it is not in any way
disruptive to the interstate system to have the contract governed by the
policy choices of the most interested state. As noted above, franchisors
have no difficulty franchising nationwide while complying with the good
faith termination provisions of particular states. In such cases, while it is
reasonable for the out-of-state party who contracts on a nationwide basis to
seek to have all its contracts interpreted and generally governed by one law,
it is unreasonable for them to expect exemption from local mandatory law
simply because they come from out-of-state.'0 9
107. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 393-96, 397-98.
108. Such a policy was apparently behind the court's decision in Reger v. National Ass'n of
Bedding Mfg., 83 Misc. 2d 577, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1975) and Kahn v. Great-West Life
Assurance Co., 61 Misc. 2d 918, 307 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. 1970). In both cases the court
enforced the choice of law clause in an insurance contract to the detriment of a New York resident
and in contravention of a New York policy to protect the insured. In both cases, however, the
court believed it was necessary that the group contract, which insured a number of people over
more than one state, be applied uniformly throughout the various states.
109. The Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives has noted that na-
tional franchisors are subject to a number of different state franchising laws which results in "a
confusing patchwork of regulatory requirements that can make compliance not only burdensome
but potentially hazardous." HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 52, at 29. However,
the committee concluded that "little evidence has been produced to show that current disclosure
policies and procedures have significantly added to the cost or adversely affected franchise sales."
Id. at 31.
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Both Professors Weintraub' 10 and Cavers111 have also emphasized that
where the mandatory law is meant to protect a particular group or class,
because of inferior bargaining position, for example, and the party seeking
to invoke the law is part of that class, then the rule of party autonomy
should give way. Specifically, Professor Cavers urges the application of
protective legislation, despite the parties' choice, if the protective party re-
sides in the legislating state and the transaction was centered there.112 This
is especially so, argues Weintraub, when the party against whom the
mandatory law is invoked should have been aware from the circumstances
surrounding the transaction that the interests of the legislating state were
implicated.1 13
In the cases criticized above, the courts applied a choice of law clause to
deprive franchisees of the protective laws of their own states, enacted to
cover the very situations being litigated. The enacting state's interest in,
and nexus to, the case could not have been clearer. Where, however, a
franchisee, or any party, seeks to override a choice of law clause simply to
obtain the benefit of its own general law over the chosen law of the contract,
there is little reason not to honor the choice of the parties.
1 14
These standards: the protective nature of the mandatory rule; the de-
gree to which it was intended to protect the party invoking it; the interstate
or international character of the contract; a party's need for uniformity
among jurisdictions; and the legitimate expectations of the parties that the
policy of an interested state is implicated, all help the courts to achieve a
reasoned balancing between the parties' choice and mandatory law. 115 Ap-
plying those factors to the franchise context, it is clear that choice of law
110. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 423, 430.
111. D. CAVERS, supra note 39, at 181-98.
112. Id. at 181, 194.
113. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 430.
114. See eg. Moses v. Business Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir. 1991)
(Franchisees sought to use their home law as to availability of punitive damages on a fraud claim;
court applied choice of law clause instead); Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, Inc., 933 F.2d
1253, 1258-59 (4th Cir. 1991) (In action based in part on breach of contract, fraud and violation of
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, franchisee sought to apply Texas standard of proof as to
fraud claims; court applied choice of law clause instead).
115. To make these issues more explicit, and to eliminate RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 187's reliance upon the concept of "fundamental policy," § 187(2) might be
rewritten as follows:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties
will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved
by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, if
(a) the chosen state has a substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction or
there is another reasonable basis for the parties' choice, and
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clauses should not be honored so as to divest franchisees of protective
legislation.
Finally, an interested state could insure the application of its law, at
least in the state and federal1 16 courts of its state, by statutorily making the
choice of law decision for the court.117 In its franchise law, the state can
expressly provide that its law will govern, notwithstanding choice of law
clauses specifying the application of another state's law. In response to the
Modern Computer decision, Minnesota did exactly that.11 Of course, if
such clauses become popular, the battle will merely shift to the issue of
forum selection. 119
VI. CHOICE OF FORUM CLAUSES
By including a choice of forum clause in its standard contract, a
franchisor can choose a jurisdiction convenient to it and inconvenient to a
franchisee without resources to a distant forum. 120 The franchisor could
also choose a forum more hospitable to its position. By reaching agreement
on its choice of forum, the franchisor may effectively dictate the choice of
law decision.21
The United States Supreme Court has been particularly receptive to
choice of forum clauses, advising federal courts to honor such clauses, ab-
sent a showing of "fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power
... "122 While some courts have distinguished this holding by noting its
(b) the parties' need for certainty and uniformity or the needs of the interstate or inter-
national system clearly outweigh the interest of a state in having its mandatory law
applied.
116. Federal Courts sitting in cases based upon diversity of citizenship are required to apply
the choice of law rules of the states in which they sit. See supra note 77.
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6(1) (1971): "A court, subject
to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law."
118. See supra note 85.
119. The battle could, in fact, become a race to the courthouse. If the franchisee sues first in
its home state court and the franchisor removes to federal court, a transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to federal court in the designated forum will bring with it the franchisee's home choice-
of-law rules. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Thus, in attempting to defeat a
state law mandating its application, a franchisor could either commence its action first in the
designated forum (which would not be bound by the choice-of-law statute), or move to dismiss the
franchisee's state action, rather than removing to federal court.
120. See supra note 70.
121. See Note, Choice of Law, Venue and Convenient-to-Jurisdiction Provisions in California
Commercial aLending.Agreements, 23 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 1337 (1990) (arguing that parties should
bootstrap their choice of law clauses by specifying a forum which would be hospitable to embrace-
ment of the choice of law clause).
122. Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972). See also Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (choice of forum in Paris held binding in suit under the Securities
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international context and the need for a neutral forum in such a context,123
other courts have applied the ruling to domestic cases to insure litigation at
a place set forth in the contract. 124 While some states may try by statute to
prohibit such choice of forum clauses, 125 such an effort would prove to be
essentially ineffective in federal court,126 where federal procedural rules
would override such statutes.
More recently the supreme court has emphasized that, in ruling on a
motion to transfer an action, federal courts should not give dispositive
weight to a choice of forum clause, but such a clause is "a significant factor
that figures centrally in the district court's calculus." 12 7
While inconvenient to the franchisee, the choice of a particular court
should still provide the franchisee a forum within which to argue for appli-
cation of its own franchisee-protection law. The franchisee may be de-
prived of that opportunity, however, if the forum selection clause has
mandated arbitration. By choosing arbitration, the franchisor may avoid
the application of any state's protective legislation.1 28 Under the Federal
and Exchange Act of 1934); Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (Whether forum selection
clause will be honored in federal court on a motion to transfer is a matter of federal law, not state
law.).
123. Standard Office Systems v. Ricoh, 742 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (Bremen not
dispositive in domestic action after Stewart; other factors outweigh the choice of law clause);
Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (The Bremen decision distin-
guished, and the choice of Ohio forum was rejected in light of Wisconsin's strong interest in
enforcing its Fair Dealership Law and the greater ability of a Wisconsin federal court to apply
that law.).
124. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy and O'Connor, J.J., concurring) (federal courts
should enforce "valid forum selection clauses... in all but the most exceptional cases."); North-
western Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990) (Bremen held applicable to domestic
breach of contract action); Docksider Ltd. v. Sea Technology, 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Bremen held applicable to domestic distribution dispute). Bense v. Interstate Battery System of
Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982) (Bremen, 407 U.S. 1 (1972), and Scherk, 417 U.S. 506
(1974), held applicable in domestic franchise dispute); Knudson v. Rexair, 749 F. Supp. 214 (D.
Minn. 1990) (Bremen and Stewart held applicable in domestic franchise dispute); Benge v.
Software Galeria, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (Bremen held applicable in domestic
franchise dispute). Compare Jones v. Webrecht, 901 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (Bremen held applica-
ble to domestic contract dispute; the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Stewart did not
change the Bremen rule) with Red Bull Ass'n v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1988) (court found that Stewart relaxed Bremen rule and gave the court greater discretion to
ignore the forum selection clause in the context of a civil rights claim).
125. See e.g. MODEL FRANCHISE INVESTMENT ACT, supra note 7, at § 14 (providing that "a
provision in a franchise agreement restricting jurisdiction or venue to a forum outside of [name of
jurisdiction] is void with respect to a claim otherwise enforcable under this Act.").
126. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying
text. But see Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 29, 31 (1988).
128. See Yntema, supra note 4, at 356 (Arbitration clauses are "a means by which the parties
can unqualifiedly determine the law of their contract, viz., by selection of the forum.").
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Arbitration Act,'2 9 such agreements, if they relate to interstate commerce,
must be enforced. 130 Moreover, the Supreme Court has shown a willing-
ness to enforce such clauses, even when the franchisee raises substantial
claims invoking important national public policy, such as those under the
federal antitrust, securities, and anti-discrimination laws.' Indeed, in a
decision which should strike fear in the hearts of all franchisees, Mitsubishi
Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 32 the Supreme Court invoked
129. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
130. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (California franchise law's prohibi-
tion on compulsory arbitration preempted by Federal Arbitration Act); Saturn Distr. Corp. v.
Williams, 905 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1991) (Virginia's statute
prohibiting automobile manufacturers from requiring arbitration clauses in franchise agreements
held preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act); Seymour v. Gloria Jean's Coffe Bean Fran.
Corp., 732 F. Supp. 988 (D. Minn. 1990) (Minnesota Act and regulation prohibiting compulsory
arbitration of franchise disputes preempted by Federal Arbitration Act).
The combination of an arbitration clause and a choice of law clause, however, can lead to a
result unexpected by either party. In Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board. of Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989), the parties had agreed to arbitrate all
disputes and had agreed that California law would govern the contract. The Federal Arbitration
Act, mandates that all such agreements to arbitrate in contracts relating to interstate commerce
shall be enforced and the Act preempts all contrary state law. Yet, since the parties agreed to
apply California law, and such law allows for a stay of arbitration pending litigation already
commenced and involving third parties, the Supreme Court held that the California state court, in
applying California law, was free to stay the arbitration while the court action proceeded. In
dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the choice of law clause was
meant to govern the substantive rights and duties of the parties and could not have been intended
to modify the enforceability of the arbitration clause under the Federal Act. Volt Information, at
1260-62. Cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (arbitration clause enforced as to
claims arising under the federal securities laws without any consideration of Illinois law, the law
expressly chosen by the parties in their contract).
131. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (claim under
Securities Act of 1933 subject to arbitration pursuant to agreement); Shearson/American Express
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (claim under Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 subject
to arbitration pursuant to agreement between broker and client); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Puerto Rican auto dealer required to arbitrate
antitrust claims against car manufacturer before an arbitration panel in Japan, pursuant to choice
of forum clause in dealership agreement). Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., - U.S. -
59 LW4407 (1991) (claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act subject to compul-
sory arbitration); cf McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (arbitration
under collective bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (an employee's claim
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 not barred by prior arbitration); Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (arbitration of claim of employment discrimina-
tion does not bar an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17 (1988)).
The first group of cases cited above hold that arbitration proceedings are conclusive as to
claims under the statutes named. The comparison cases hold that arbitation in no way affects
one's rights under the statutes with which they deal.
132. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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the Federal Arbitration Act, the Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,133 and the courts' duty to
"subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability to the international policy
favoring commercial arbitration" 13 4 to hold that a local Puerto Rican car
dealer had to prosecute his antitrust claim against Mitsubishi Motors before
a group of Japanese arbitrators in Toyko in a non-public hearing without
the right of discovery or a right to a written decision.13 5 Because the arbi-
trator is generally free to ignore applicable substantive law without fear of
reversal, 136 the net effect of this laissez-faire policy is to eviscerate the fran-
133. Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958. Despite its
title, the convention goes beyond the enforcement of arbitration awards and binds the tribunals of
each signatory state to honor agreements to arbitrate "unless it finds that the said agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" (art. 11 (3)) or the dispute does not
involve "subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration" (art. 11 (1)).
Additionally, a tribunal need not enforce an arbitration award where the "recognition or en-
forcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that county." (art. V (2)(b)).
Section 201 of the Federal Arbitration Act in turn provides that the convention shall be enforced
in United States courts.
134. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 639. The Court's incantation of international comity is dubious.
Unlike Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which involved the purchase by an international American
company of European assets from a European seller, the Mitsubishi case involved a local car
dealer, whose rights and duties should not depend on whether he sells Fords, Volvos or Toyotas.
As the dissent pointed out, "[w]hen Mitsubishi enters the American market and plans to engage in
business in that market over a period of years, it must recognize its obligation to comply with
American law and to be subject to the remedial provisions of American statutes." Mitshubishi,
473 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 657 n.31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision was especially
surprising, since, as the dissent pointed out, the agreement to arbitrate applied to specific aspects
of the contract, none of which were remotely related to the subject of the dispute or to the fran-
chisee's antitrust claim.
136. See Koch Oil, S.A. v. Transocean Gulf Oil Co., 751 F.2d 551, 554 (2nd Cir. 1985)
("Such limited review (of an arbitrator's award] is necessary if arbitration is to serve as a quick,
inexpensive and informal means of private dispute resolution."); Marion Mfg. Co. v. W.B. Long,
588 F.2d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 1978) ("we do not sit to review the merits of the arbitration award"
even when the award was for specific performance of a contract for the purchase of goods.);
Contracting N.W., Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, Iowa, 713 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983) (Holding
that the court may not inquire into the merits of the claim to be arbitrated).
In Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, however, the Supreme Court said that American courts would
have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest
in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed... while the efficacy of the
arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain
minimal, it would not require instrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cogni-
zance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.
Id. at 638. Considering the admittedly "minimal" judicial review of arbitration awards, the fact
that the arbitrators do not necessarily have any familiarity with American antitrust law, the fact
that arbitrators often, and intentionally, do not articulate the reasons for their decisions, and the
fact that, Japanese arbitrators are not even required to present a written decision, id. at 657 n.31
(Stevens, J., dissenting), the Court's assurance that the franchisee's antitrust claims would be
heard was somewhat disingenious.
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chisee's substantive rights under its own state's franchisee-protection
laws. 137
The better approach is to construe both agreements to arbitrate, and the
Federal Arbitration Act, to require arbitration of the parties' rights and
duties as set forth in their contract, but not to give arbitrators the power to
effectuate or eviscerate important statutory safeguards. 138 Arbitrators may
be fully capable of deciding whether a dealer has met its duties under a
franchise contract, but a dealer which invokes its statutory rights outside of
the contract should have the right to have those claims heard by a court.
The right to choose arbitration, like the right to choose the applicable law,
should give way to the legislative determination of an interested state that
important public policy concerns override the parties' usual freedom of
contract.
There is also an important federalism issue at stake. Enforcement of the
Federal Arbitration Act, and implementation of the strong federal interest
in the enforcement of choice of forum clauses, can inhibit a party's ability to
invoke protective state legislation. Federal courts have recognized that
both the Federal Arbitration Act, and the federal policy of favoring choice
of forum clauses, must give way when they impede the effectuation of sig-
nificant federal policies, such as the enforcement of civil rights laws. 139
Similar deference has not been shown to state policies, however. "40 In its
rush to eliminate parochialism and to hold parties to their "choice" of a
particular forum, the United States Supreme Court has ignored the states'
legislative determination that, in certain kinds of transactions, and for cer-
tain kinds of parties, the contract should have limited applicability.
137. See, eg., Smith v. Pay-Fone Sys., Inc., 627 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (franchisee's
claims under its home state's Fair Business Franchise Act are sent to arbitration in light of clause
in contract specifying binding arbitration).
138. This is a position advocated by Justice Stevens in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 650 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The Court's decisions in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987), and Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S 477 (1989),
however, indicate that this view has not won adherence in the Court.
139. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (arbitration under
collective bargaining agreement does not preclude subsequent claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Red
Bull Assoc. v. Best Western Int'l, Inc., 862 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988) (forum selection clause need
not be honored where to do so would require plaintiff to litigate in an inconvenient forum and
thereby inhibit enforcement of civil rights laws); but see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
- U.S. - 59 LW 4407 (1991) (claims under the Age Discrimination Employment Act are sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration).
140. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting) (FAA was not intended to displace all state substantive law).
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Justice Scalia raised this issue in his dissent in Stewart Organization, Ina
v. Ricoh Corp..141 In that case, the Court held that the question of whether
or not a choice of forum clause would be honored in federal court would be
decided by federal law, specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).14 2 Justice Scalia
conceded that 1404(a) governed, but argued that in applying that section a
federal court sitting in Alabama should honor Alabama law which prohib-
its the enforcement of choice of law clauses. Scalia, in perhaps an overly
simplistic analysis, concluded that Alabama's "substantive" law on the
point had to be followed under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.143 We need not
accept all of Scalia's reasoning to appreciate his sensitivity to the interest of
the states in limiting parties' contractual rights in certain instances. If, for
example, Alabama refused to enforce choice of forum clauses in a franchise
context because it believed that the franchisee had little bargaining power
and should not be required to litigate disputes in a distant forum, the fed-
eral courts would be frustrating important state policy by ignoring such a
legislative determination."4
VII. CONCLUSION
Because contract law itself contains an inherent conflict between the
rights of the parties to choose the terms and conditions of their relationship,
and the need of the state to override those wishes under certain circum-
stances, choice of law principles must also explicitly recognize and accom-
modate that inherent conflict. A choice of law rule based upon the near
universal pre-eminence of party autonomy is inconsistent with basic con-
tract law. Choice of law rules must therefore accept and accommodate the
principle of legislative supremacy over the rights of the parties. Of course,
in the interstate or international context, legislative priorities may conflict,
and the parties may choose to be governed by the law of a state which has
priorities in conflict with those of the most interested state. The court is
then faced with the classic balancing of the interests of the two states, the
needs of the interstate system and the rights and expectations of the parties.
Such balancing cannot be avoided by blind deference to the choice of law
141. 487 U.S. 22, 33-41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) provides that the court may exercise its discretion to transfer
an action to another district court where the action could have brought, "[flor the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice .... "
143. Eric R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
144. Cf. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (Holding that Florida court
has personal jurisdiction over Michigan franchisee because the contractual relationship with Bur-
ger King, headquartered in Miami, is a minimum contact. Court emphasized the fact that the
parties had chosen Florida law to govern their contract.).
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clause. The stronger the connection with the interested state, the greater
the state's interest in the issue, and the greater the relationship between the
policy issue and the facts of the case, the more likely it will be that the court
will apply, and should apply the law of the interested state in contravention
of the law chosen by the parties.
Such a policy will not significantly limit the value of choice of law
clauses in interstate or international contracts. Contrary to the assertions
of some, 145 the primary purpose of such choice of law clauses is not to evade
the mandatory rules of an interested state. Rather, it is to ensure a consis-
tent body of law for the interpretation of terms and conditions with regard
to matters over which the parties have the power of choice. Given the long-
standing reluctance of courts to allow the use of choice of law clauses as a
device to evade mandatory rules of an interested state, it is unrealistic for
attorneys to rely on such clauses in the expectation that they will avoid
mandatory rules in the future. While Restatement (Second) section 187(2)
seems to invite them to do so, it is an invitation which should be rejected.
145. See Trautman, supra note 1, at 540.
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